


Chapter 3

The Capacity of the Civil Service in Wales

Anna Nicholl





The Capacity of the Civil Service in Wales

Anna Nicholl

Introduction

This paper is concerned with the civil service working within the Welsh Government, a relatively small proportion of the total numbers of civil servants working in Wales. It covers three areas:

- The capacity of the civil service in Wales in terms of developing policy and legislation as well as operational delivery.
- The relationships of the Welsh civil service with the UK Home civil service and the wider public sector in Wales.
- The level of political control and co-ordination.

Research for the paper comprised a review of existing literature and websites, plus conversations with 19 senior figures within and outside the Welsh Government. These included current and previous Ministers and Special Advisers, civil servants ranging in grade from Head of Policy to Director General and senior figures independent from government but with experience of either working with or within government at a senior level. I have also drawn on my own experience as Special Adviser to the Welsh Government between 2008 and 2011.

I argue that whilst there are real capacity issues within the Welsh civil service, the issues that need to be addressed as a priority do not require the creation of a separate civil service for Wales. Neither are mergers with other public bodies in Wales nor politicization of the civil service silver bullets for civil service reform. Indeed, any of these could be a distraction from dealing with the more pressing issues around leadership and accountability – including political leadership and accountability – management, human resources, policy and delivery.

Overview of capacity

As of March 2011 there were 5,360 full time equivalent civil servants within the Welsh Government (ONS, 2011). At first glance this seems comparable with the Scottish Government, which employed 5,460 civil servants excluding executive agencies in March 2011 (ONS, 2011). However, the two governments have a different mix of functions delivered centrally and by government sponsored bodies which makes direct comparison impossible.

There have been significant cuts to the Welsh civil service following recent budget cuts across the UK civil service. In response this, the Welsh Government introduced *Managing for Less*, an efficiency

programme that reduced the size of its estate and saw 1,000 people leave the organisation via voluntary redundancy. This significant reduction in capacity appears to have been managed smoothly but has taken place at a time of increased responsibility. However, capacity is not simply about numbers. It is also about ensuring the right people with the right skills are in the right place at the right time. *Managing for Less* does not appear to have addressed these issues.

Legislation

The most recent challenge is to deliver the first Welsh Government legislative programme following the implementation of Part 4 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 from May 2011. Everyone I spoke with agreed that this was a significant challenge in the immediate term and that building capacity to tackle it, in terms of numbers and skills, is a government priority.

The legislative programme is significant, but with 21 Bills over five years it does not appear over ambitious. Although not directly comparable, some 16 Scottish Government Bills are passed annually. There appears no reason why the necessary skills cannot be developed in the medium term.

Several people expressed caution at over-emphasising legislative capacity on its own. A greater concern was that the urge to legislate, sometimes without clarity on the problem it was meant to address or whether legislation was an effective vehicle, might drain capacity from other areas which may be better placed to deliver.

Responsibilities without resources

A further strain on capacity is the powers and responsibilities being devolved by the UK government without Welsh Government having asked for them. This includes Council Tax Benefit and the Social Fund. These are not only new areas of expertise to be developed but they also come with significantly reduced budgets and insufficient consideration to administrative costs. There is a danger that devolution is seen as a cost saving mechanism by the UK Government. Devolution of functions must be accompanied by the resources to deliver.

Strategy, policy and delivery

Welsh Government has developed its policy capacity significantly since the creation of the National Assembly in 1999. In pre-Assembly Welsh Office days there was little demand for home grown policy development. There are now civil servants experienced in developing policy and many have developed a strong track record in doing so. However, weaknesses remain.

Wales has far fewer people working on each policy area compared with Whitehall or Scotland. It may be more Welsh Government resource could be targeted at this, but it also demands a different approach to policy development and delivery. The depth of policy expertise within a small civil service will always be limited, making working with external partners even more important.

Improvements which would increase the capacity to deliver within reduced resources are:

- Central strategic resource, making connections across policy areas and providing clear underpinning direction.
- Hard analysis of existing and proposed policies to ensure they are robust, based on a thorough assessment of the problem and how to achieve desired outcomes.

- Value for money analysis of current and existing policies – providing financial analysis, in a way that the Treasury does in Whitehall, and blocking policies that do not meet the test.
- Understanding that implementation and delivery is core to policy development.
- Evaluation to be built into every major programme with reports made available for public scrutiny.
- External capacity to feed into policy and to provide robust external challenge based on expert analysis.

New policies that cannot pass these tests should not be progressed. There was also a call for existing policies to be interrogated to assess whether they are achieving the desired outcomes and represent value for money. Generalist policy makers need further support in developing skills but there was also a call for more statisticians, economists, scientists, social scientists and others with specialist and technical knowledge to feed into policy.

The First Minister has been clear that he does not want to see outsourcing of policy development, arguing it represents privatization of core civil service functions. In my conversations, there was concern at the weakness of wider policy networks in Wales to contribute to and challenge public policy. Similarly, whilst some teams work in close partnership with existing external policy networks there is still much room to strengthen this across the civil service. There was also support for using more of the various mechanisms available to bring more external experts into Welsh Government. However, there were real concerns expressed about impartiality should the core policy development function be outsourced as well as concerns that by-passing the civil service would fail to develop the much needed core capacity in the longer term.

The Welsh Government should set out its own positive approach to securing external expertise across strategy, policy and delivery. There is also a challenge for civil society to increase its capacity to contribute to and challenge public policy.

In autumn 2012 the Welsh Government put out a tender for a Public Policy Institute whose remit will underline these concerns. The tender document stated that the new Institute would be run by a Director with a small staff, and with an Advisory Board whose chair would be nominated by the Government.

In January 2013 a contract was awarded to the Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research, Data and Methods, co-ordinated by Cardiff University. The role of the Institute is envisaged as to:

- Provide short turn-around advice or think pieces on strategic issues, commissioned by Ministers, but not to commission substantive research projects of its own.
- Support the Cabinet in identifying a small number of strategic cross-cutting priorities to be addressed by its work.
- Support Ministers, at their request, to understand their research and analytical needs more widely.
- Sign-post to expert sources of advice, in Wales or internationally, and support Ministers in identifying the best way of engaging with this expertise.
- Make connections between insights and evidence across the Welsh Government's research activity.

It is envisaged that the Institute will deliver these objectives by:

- Building and mobilising a network of people and research organisations with vision and expertise, capable of responding rapidly and flexibly to Welsh Government requirements.

- Helping inform the commissioning of research by the Welsh Government's Knowledge and Analytical Service, and providing strategic advice on the interpretation of research findings, and on any gaps or duplication in Welsh Government research;
- Developing flexible ways of working to maximise impact, with less emphasis on written reports and more on communicating, influencing policy, getting the right people together and ensuring effective and relevant links are made.
- Identifying and developing synergies across different disciplines and policy areas.
- Building partnerships with HE institutions and Welsh, UK and international research institutes and think tanks;
- Deploying a small budget for events and targeted work commissions, managing a call-off contract for such commissions, and supplementing its budget if required.

The Welsh Government has recently developed *Delivering Results*, a set of principles on the development, integration and implementation of policy and building a sound business case for its delivery. This is aimed at addressing many of the concerns around policy capacity that have been expressed. The Welsh Government's commitment to introduce a Delivery Unit as well as funding the Institute of Public Policy should also go some way to addressing broader capacity concerns. It would be useful to have evaluation mechanisms for these initiatives.

Management and leadership

Whilst there are real pressures on resources within the civil service many feel there is still scope to significantly increase capacity through better management, leadership, training and development and reform of human resources systems including some which challenge the basic principles of the Home Civil Service. Increasing accountability was also highlighted through the conversations and in the literature (Lodge and Rogers, 2006).

A series of reforms have been introduced in recent years. Some have had a major impact on the structure of the organisation, including the merger of executive agencies and new regional offices. As Permanent Secretary, Gill Morgan reformed the management structure, bringing in a small group of senior civil servants (Director Generals) to form a tighter management team at the top of the organisation, work across departments and support negotiations with Whitehall. This brought plenty of critics. It has not produced the desired joined-up approach and high personnel turnover suggests improvements are needed. But there is support for the principle of a small team of very senior civil servants working closely with Cabinet to provide stronger strategic management and leadership as distinct from the role of departmental Directors. Making this effective will be a challenge for the new Permanent Secretary, Derek Jones, who took over in October 2012.

There have been calls for reforms that go much further than this, challenging whether some of the core principles of the Home Civil Service, which have been in place broadly since the mid-19th Century, are fit for public administration in the 21st Century – whether in Wales or across the UK (Davies, 2012; Institute of Government, 2012; Lodge and Rodgers, 2006; Straw, 2004). The public spending cuts are a driver for deeper reforms. Welsh Labour's 2011 manifesto included a commitment to:

“...review and seek realignment of the governance and performance of the Assembly Government civil service, better to reflect the developing requirements of devolution whilst remaining part of the Home Civil Service.”

The Welsh Government has developed a programme of renewal called *Fit for the Future* accompanied

by an *Action Plan*. This sets out the Welsh Government's distinct vision for reform, based on collaboration rather than competition. The Civil Service Reform Plan introduced by the UK Government will not apply to Welsh Government.

Fit for the Future builds on a series of reforms in recent years, particularly *Managing with Less*, the voluntary redundancy scheme and reducing the estate. It was initially focussed on human resources but has since become a vehicle of the broader renewal programme. It aims to tackle some core issues including:

- What the civil service should and shouldn't do given its smaller size.
- Driving better policy making and implementation.
- Strengthening civil service capabilities including improving talent, performance management and upgraded project, programme, financial and contract management skills.
- Introducing new management systems to support continuous improvement and innovation.
- Clarifying expectations of what it means to work for the Welsh Government.

In doing so, it aims to address many of the criticisms of the civil service system over the last decade and more.

Not everybody I spoke to was convinced that *Fit for the Future* would produce the real reform needed and yet it's vital to effective government in Wales that it does. *Fit for the Future* has been the subject of widespread consultation and discussion internally, but does not appear to have been released externally. There is no evidence of Wales-specific external research or challenge feeding into the reforms, unlike the Whitehall reforms. This could be an early role for the new Public Policy Institute. At the bare minimum, the Welsh Government should publish its reform programme to increase openness and accountability and to enable external input.

More dynamic and flexible approaches are needed that can target limited resources at priorities. There is widespread perception that the civil service is slow, bureaucratic and resistant to change. Such criticism is heard just as strongly internally as externally. The challenge is to make better use of existing human and financial resources. As one interviewee commented, "there's a great big untapped potential in the waste." A snap shot of where resources (staff time as well as financial resources) are currently targeted would enable proper assessment.

Some of the changes needed are not simply managerial but about challenging key principles underpinning today's civil service. For example, shifting away from a permanent civil service to appointments based on time limited contracts for specific posts and introducing much greater public accountability on areas of civil service responsibility as well as political accountability on civil service direction.

An area that needs attention is training and development. Many continental civil services have extensive programmes of training and development including France and Germany (Horton, 2011) and there have been calls for similar models to be considered in Wales. This would entail setting tough standards for civil servants before they were able to either enter or progress within the civil service. Depending on responsibility, this could vary from ability to present a clear written argument to understanding of broader Welsh society and institutions. This could take the form of collaboration across Universities and Colleges.

The Welsh Government and learning providers should explore the potential for establishing a civil

service school or college, based on the specific approach of the Welsh Government civil service.

Key tests for *Fit for the Future* are whether the First Minister and new Permanent Secretary can articulate publicly why civil service reform is needed, exactly what issues the programme is aiming to address, and how their alternative approach can enable civil servants to deliver outcomes for citizens in Wales which are not currently being achieved. Political leadership is needed, not in a way that compromises civil service impartiality, but to secure political support and accountability for some difficult reforms.

Whitehall

Whilst this paper is focussed on the Welsh Government, 84 per cent of civil servants in Wales fall under Whitehall Departments. Central government in Whitehall retains responsibility for a great deal of policy and services in Wales. Capacity of Whitehall departments to understand and respond to devolution is relatively low despite efforts at improvement (Welsh Affairs Committee, 2010). People I spoke to reported a mixed picture with some good working relationships. Some approaches work better than others with Agriculture, where there is a need for all four nations to develop common UK positions on European issues, being seen as a positive example. One person suggested that poor understanding of devolution has led to Bill teams in Whitehall simply devolving powers when it comes to Wales – giving Welsh Government considerable responsibilities with no real negotiation around appropriateness or sufficient resources to deliver.

Structure

Accountability within the Home Civil Service

Whilst civil servants in the Welsh Government are responsible for delivering the First Minister's programme for government and are led by the Permanent Secretary in Wales, they are also part of the British Home Civil Service which is ultimately led by the UK Prime Minister and the Head of UK Civil Service. This is also the case for the Scottish Government officials.

This presents clear issues around accountability which were highlighted in Welsh Labour's 2011 manifesto and which came to the fore following Gill Morgan's announcement that she would be standing down as Permanent Secretary. The appointment process for the Permanent Secretary is formally managed by the Cabinet Office and approved by the Civil Service Commission. Until the recent appointment of Derek Jones, the final approval had come for the Prime Minister. However, the Prime Minister has now delegated his role in making senior civil service appointments in the devolved administrations to the Head of the Civil Service, confirming that the only political input into senior Welsh civil service appointments should come from the First Minister. The First Minister had a significant role in the recruitment process for Derek Jones, maintaining political involvement in line with the civil service recruitment principles (Civil Service Commission, 2012).

This is in line with the process used to appoint the Permanent Secretary to the Scottish Executive, introduced following a recommendation in the Calman Commission's report. However, Parry argues that delegating the Prime Minister's role as political head of the civil service not to the First Ministers but to the Head of the UK civil service might create even less accountability to devolved governments (Parry 2012). A much stronger approach would be for the Prime Minister to delegate approval for the appointment of the new Permanent Secretary to the First Minister of Wales as political head of the Welsh Government. It is recommended that this is introduced in the future.

Separate Welsh Civil Service

Accountability has been central to many of the arguments for a separate Welsh civil service. These arguments were particularly strong in the early years of devolution (Cole et. al., 2003). Many doubted that it would be possible to retain a single civil service given differing policy direction under devolution, let alone survive different political parties in government across the UK.

In practice, the unified civil service has survived relatively unscathed. Some have argued it has in fact proved helpful in negotiating political differences (see Parry, 2012). Arguments that have always been used in support of a unified, including the shared labour market, still have considerable support. Interestingly, the SNP dropped calls for a separate civil service relatively early in their minority government. Instead, they appear to have used the Home Civil Service to their advantage (Parry, 2012).

Despite being formally part of the Home civil service, in practice the Welsh Government has considerable autonomy. Under the Welsh Ministerial Code, agreed by the First Minister as well as Prime Minister and passed by the National Assembly for Wales as well as Parliament:

“... civil servants are accountable to [Welsh] Ministers. They are in turn accountable to the National Assembly for Wales” (Civil Service Code, 2010).

The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 makes clear that officials must carry out duties for the assistance of the administration they work to, whatever the political complexion. Recruitment and pay structures are set by Welsh Government within broad recruitment principles with which few would disagree. Welsh Government is now undertaking a separate reform programme that will surely make distinctions clearer again. None of the civil servants I spoke to were in any doubt that they worked to the First Minister and Cabinet of the Welsh Government.

Parry has described separate civil services in Wales and Scotland as having become a ‘non-issue’ (Parry, 2012). That’s not quite true in Wales. A proposal for a separate civil service was included in Plaid Cymru’s 2011 manifesto. Some interviewees still felt it was vital in order to secure civil service loyalty to the Welsh Government Cabinet rather than to Whitehall.

There is no reason to think that the Welsh Government civil service could not adapt to being separated relatively easily and create mechanisms to protect areas that are valued including links across the labour market. The Northern Ireland Civil Service has been entirely independent since the 1920s. In practice it has worked in parallel with the British Home Civil Service, often mirroring or adapting Whitehall practices, in ways not a great deal differently from the current Welsh Government (Birrell, 2007). However, creating a separate civil service is not a priority issue and nor is it capable of addressing the substantive issues on capacity.

Unified Welsh Public Service

Arguments for a unified Welsh Public Service have been ongoing since the early days of devolution (Prosser, 2003). They have received a considerable degree of support and are being taken forward in practice. The Welsh Labour 2011 manifesto committed to “continue our work towards establishing a pan-Welsh Public Service development and improvement function.”

Arguments in favour are based on the development of a stronger workforce with the skills to achieve the improvements in public service delivery, to increase the pool of talent and to strengthen the link between policy and delivery. It would also bring a territorial focus and ethos to delivery of public services in Wales – the way we do things around here as distinct from over there. It is also linked

to the principle of collaboration rather than competition, marking a distinction with the approach taken by the UK government. This is in line with the mergers of executive agencies since devolution. Indeed, Wales has been cited as an example of a trend to reintegrate policy and delivery in civil services internationally (Lodge and Kalitowski, 2007).

This is being taken forward by the Welsh Government through *Working Together for Wales – A Strategic Framework for the Public Services in Wales*, the Local Government (Collaboration Measures) (Wales) Bill, the development of a national secondment scheme, and Public Services Management Wales as a training and development programme for leadership and management skills across the public sector in Wales (as well as relevant third and private sector bodies).

Some people envisaged the unified public service going further to form a single institution. Civil service structures that span central and local governments as well as wider public sector bodies are not unusual (Horton, 2011). However, some voiced concerns that such mergers would blur accountability. Others highlighted some of the intractable practical issues including merging pension schemes. Mergers of this nature are hugely resource intensive and can be destabilising.

The current approach which seeks to tap into the potential benefits of much greater collaborative working without the difficulties of actual merger appears to be a good way forward. However, a more structured and proactive secondment scheme is needed if it is to be effective, perhaps more formally linked to civil servants' career progression. Moving away from a permanent civil service to contract and time specific posts would also open opportunities to the third and private sectors.

Political control and co-ordination

Political control versus impartiality of the civil service, the relationships between politicians and civil servants, and the split in their responsibilities are ongoing sources of tension and perhaps always will be. They are not unique to Wales or the British civil service.

The main frustration for Ministers in Wales appears to be a lack of control over civil service performance, despite this being critical in achieving political priorities. Basic principles of civil service impartiality mean this is strictly out of bounds. I heard of several examples where Ministers had felt civil servants were not delivering against a clear direction (occasionally purposely) and yet they were unable to address this. There appears a dislocation, where leaders of an institution have no powers, responsibilities or accountability for its management and yet are directly accountable for overall delivery.

On the flip side, civil servants must serve the government of the day and this means by and large doing what Ministers say. If Ministers insist on introducing policies which are poorly thought through or only designed to grab headlines, so be it: the civil servant role is to support them to deliver. They are ill-equipped to defend themselves against Ministerial or public attack.

IPPR has described this as a "governance vacuum" in which the relative accountability of Ministers and civil servants is blurred, leading to a "ambiguity, confusion, weak leadership and buck-passing" (Lodge and Rogers, 2006). They call for clear accountability between Ministerial decisions and civil service operational delivery and financial management. These concerns around confused accountability and buck-passing were referred to by several interviewees. Andrew Davies has also called for much clearer accountability (Davies, 2012).

One response to this is to call for much greater political control and politicisation of the civil

service. An option is to increase the number and strengthen the role of Special Advisers. Despite concerns about quality and excessive focus on communications at the expense of policy, none of the interviewees were against the role of Special Adviser. They are valued in different ways by Ministers, civil servants and external groups. Political advisers are common in civil services across the world. However, whilst there are some good arguments for clarifying their role and even increasing their numbers to provide clearer strategic direction politically, it is difficult to see how this could tackle the more fundamental underlying issues.

Another alternative is to introduce a politically appointed senior civil service. Many civil services are far more politicized. In the US some 3,000 senior civil servants change with political administrations. Whilst there are advantages, there are also disadvantages, not least the tendency for cronyism. Most people thought the dangers would likely outweigh the advantages. Again, many people questioned whether this would address the underlying issues. It may move the tension between political leadership and an impartial civil service down a few grades without addressing it fundamentally. It is doubtful whether a political appointee leading and managing the civil service would be any more effective than a person appointed on merit.

In many European countries, Ministers can be directly appointed by the First Minister even if they are not elected members of the legislature. All Ministers are still accountable to the legislature. This has the advantage of being able to recruit people with the leadership and management skills to head large departments as Ministers, whether or not they are politicians. It has been tried with mixed success in the UK Government (Yong and Hazell, 2011). The proposal received some support from interviews. There is a great deal of talent in Wales outside government and the National Assembly is a particularly small legislature. However, most people felt breaking the democratic link would be problematic and unlikely to be popular.

Given the potential downfalls of civil service politicisation and the fact that there isn't a significant call for it, it would be preferable to find alternative ways to strengthen political control and accountability as well as civil service accountability.

The relationship between the First Minister and the new Permanent Secretary will be crucial in taking this agenda forward. The approval of the new Permanent Secretary's appointment by the First Minister would add clarity to accountability. It would state not only that the Permanent Secretary serves the Welsh Cabinet, but also that the First Minister is the political head of the civil service in Wales and should be accountable as such.

Clear political leadership in implementing *Fit for the Future* would also clarify political accountability. It would also be useful for the Permanent Secretary to be given an alternative title like Chief Executive of the Welsh Government (similar to New Zealand) to clarify that being head of the Welsh Government civil service is distinct from being a Permanent Secretary of a Whitehall Department (this would not require altering grades or create bigger institutional change).

Greater clarity should be developed to identify which decisions are made by Ministers and which by civil servants. This will demand greater transparency, including of the decision making process. Whilst there are many difficulties with the Freedom of Information Act, the principle of providing greater transparency remains crucial. Ministers and civil servants should be held to account publicly. Consideration should be given to Ministers chairing departmental boards in order to make the link between political direction and management stronger. Ministers and senior civil servants should be working together to deliver priorities.

Similarly, as political heads of the civil service, Ministers need to demonstrate clear leadership and be held to account for their role in tackling some of the major stumbling blocks in civil service reform. This includes shifting away from siloed working to integrated policy and delivery and much greater financial scrutiny.

The development of a much stronger Cabinet Office headed by a Director General is needed to drive clear strategic direction, integrated policy and improved delivery. A proper Treasury function is needed to oversee and challenge spend across government. The development of both will demand strong political leadership.

There is also scope for much stronger Private Offices to ensure Ministerial direction is understood and to challenge colleagues if briefings, communications and policy direction is not up to scratch. This might also release Special Advisers to focus on political direction as some reported too much time being taken on challenging these non-political issues.

Powers and scrutiny

This paper highlights some of the capacity issues that face the civil service in Wales. Some are specific to the Welsh situation, particularly its history of rapid change within its short lifespan. However, many are common to other parts of the British civil service and others are issues with which civil services across the world are grappling. This research has not highlighted reasons why the Welsh Government should not be able to adapt to further devolution. However, further devolution of powers needs to come with matching resources, including administrative resources.

Accountability has been highlighted as an issue, but this needs to be matched by more effective scrutiny. This includes capacity for scrutiny and challenge by civil society, academia and the media as well as the legislature.

Conclusions

The civil service, a complex and unique organisation, is an integral part of our democracy. Its effective operation is not just about delivering the priorities for the government of the day, it is also essential for the health of our public services, our private sector and civil society. It is one of the most important institutions in Wales. Identifying problems is relatively easy. It's much harder to devise ways of putting them right, as can be seen in the almost constant civil service reform programmes of the last 30 years.

The paper concludes that capacity is a real issue, including staff numbers and budgets given the public spending cuts that have accompanied increased responsibility. The Welsh Government civil service appears to have managed to adapt to this relatively well. However, other capacity could be released by reforms aimed at making our civil service system fit for demands of the 21st Century demands.

The paper makes the following proposals for civil service reform in Wales:

1. The First Minister should be formally recognised as the political head of the Welsh Government civil service and should approve future Permanent Secretary appointments.
2. The Head of the Welsh Government civil service should be given the title of Chief

Executive to highlight the distinction from being Permanent Secretary of a Whitehall Department and emphasise her/ his accountability for delivery.

3. Clear accountability should be developed around which decisions are Ministerial and which are civil service decisions.
4. A strong Cabinet Office led by a Director General should be developed to drive integrated strategy, policy and delivery.
5. A Treasury function should be developed in order to oversee and challenge spend across government and to drive value for money principles.
6. Welsh Government should implement a set of improvements to strategy, policy development and delivery (set out in the paper) to achieve more with reduced resources.
7. Welsh Government should publish *Fit for the Future* with a clear statement from the First Minister and Permanent Secretary as to why civil service reform is needed, what issues it is aiming to address and how this approach can enable the civil service to deliver better outcomes.
8. Welsh Government should set out its own positive approach to securing external expertise and challenge to support strategy, policy and delivery and ensure it has the capability to deliver.
9. Welsh Government and learning providers should explore the potential for establishing a civil service school or college.
10. Welsh Government should introduce a more proactive secondment scheme which is formally linked to progression within the civil service.

References

- Birrell, D., 'The Reform Agenda in the Northern Ireland Civil Service: The Influences of Parity, Integration, Devolution and Direct Rule', *Public Policy and Administration*, 22:275, 2007.
- Civil Service Code, (Wales), November 2010.
- Civil Service Commission, *Recruitment Principles*, April 2012
- Civil Service Statistics 2011, Office of National Statistics, October 2011
- Cole, Alistair, J. Barry Jones and Alan Storer, 'Inside the National Assembly for Wales: the Welsh Civil Service Under Devolution', *The Political Quarterly* 74: 223-232, 2003.
- Davies, Andrew, 'Tackling Wales' Sir Humphreys', *Click on Wales*, IWA, April 2012.
- Horton, S., 'Contrasting Anglo-American and Continental European civil service systems', in Massey, A. (Ed.), *International Handbook on Civil Service Systems*, Cheltenham, Glos: Edward Elgar p. 31 – 54, 2011.
- Welsh Labour Manifesto, *Standing up for Wales*, 2011.
- Lodge G. and Rogers B., *Whitehall's Black Box: accountability and performance in the senior civil service*, IPPR, 2006
- Lodge G. and Kalitowski S., *Innovations in Government: international perspectives on civil service reform*, 2007
- Parry, R., 'The Civil Service and Intergovernmental Relations in the Post-devolution UK', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 14. 285-302, 2012.
- Parry, R., 'The United Kingdom Civil Service: A Devolving System' in Massey, A. (Ed.), *International Handbook on Civil Service Systems*. Cheltenham, Glos: Edward Elgar p. 347-368, 2011.
- Prosser, P., *Development of a Welsh Public Service*, IWA, 2003.
- Riddell, P., *An open letter: two challenges and an opportunity*, Institute for Government, 2012.
- Straw E., *The Dead Generalist: Reforming the civil service and public services*, Demos, 2004.
- H.M. Government, *The Civil Service Reform Plan*, June 2012.
- Thomas, P., *Civil Service Reform: seven crucial tests for the new reform plan*, Institute for Government, 2012.
- Welsh Affairs Committee Eleventh Report: Wales and Whitehall*, March 2010.
- Welsh Government, *Consultation on Working Together for Wales, The Public Service Workforce*, Welsh Government Green Paper, May 2012.
- Yong B. and Hazell R., *Putting Goats Amongst the Wolves: appointing Ministers from outside Parliament*, The Constitution Unit, UCL, January 2011.