


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Chapter 6


# Policing Powers

Colin Rogers and James Gravelle

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# 6



## Policing Powers

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### Overview and main recommendations

Devolving policing powers to Wales would bring a range of benefits. Firstly, given the predisposition of local authorities, police forces and the Welsh Government, there is potential for improved communication and closer partnership working. Secondly, whilst reform of public services in related areas of community safety is not dependent on transfer of policing powers, the latter could act as a catalyst to their reform. Redesigning service delivery could, in turn, serve to make Wales' police forces more effective and efficient than at present. Thirdly, with powers devolved, Welsh Government Ministers would need to become fully informed about policing matters. In combination with their working more closely with Chief Constables, this should lead to clearer lines of accountability, both between police forces and the Welsh Government, and between these bodies and the Welsh public.

However, while benefits arising from proximity are evident, there could be pitfalls, such as the potential for politicisation of policing matters. This risk has been underlined by the new system of Police and Crime Commissioners, but could possibly be even greater where working relationships were particularly close.

The most significant practical consideration in the debate on devolution of policing is the financial effect of transfer of powers. There are two elements to this. Firstly, resources would need to be sufficient to ensure at least as good a standard of delivery as under the existing settlement. Over one third of funding for policing comes from the Home Office. Should powers be transferred, not only would associated monies need to be transferred in full, but the need for additional resources to establish structures to replace those at the UK level would have to be accounted for.

Secondly, concerns have been raised by experts in the field at the possibility that funding of existing priority areas – notably health and education – could be prioritised at the expense of funding the police service, to the detriment of public safety. However, it is unlikely that a Welsh government, any more than a UK government, would significantly reduce funding for the police service. In any event, this should not be regarded as a valid consideration in determining at which level responsibility for the police should lie. Rather, it is a matter of democratic accountability to the electorate.

New agreements on the operation of mutual aid would need to be reached. Clarity would be needed on how cross-border operations would be arranged and funded. This is equally true of the way that Welsh police forces would continue to interact with UK-level organisations such as the National

Crime Agency and its constituent commands.

Devolution of policing would entail the establishment of a police training college in Wales. All senior and specialist officer training is currently undertaken in England, with attendant implications for officers' understanding of the contextual differences between England and Wales. However, although Scotland has its own police college, senior officers from Scottish forces are also trained in England. Improved training capacity in Wales need not therefore imply separate provision of all aspects of police training. What must be better understood is the likely impact of transferring powers on cross-border knowledge sharing and recruitment, particularly of senior officers.

Devolution of policing would involve significant enhancement of civil service capacity. In Scotland, development of skills in this field has occurred over the course of decades. In the event of the transfer of powers Wales might not necessarily be able to rely on on-going expert advice from London-based civil servants.

It is clear that the devolution of policing would be a complex process, involving significant resources.

With the introduction of a reserved powers model for the National Assembly the timing of the devolution of policing would be an important issue. Responsibility might be reserved to Westminster until such time as this vital function could receive the full attention it requires at the time of its transfer to Wales. The suggestion has also been made that it might be appropriate to allow the new system of Police and Crime Commissioners to bed down before policing is actually devolved.

### **Current policing priorities for Wales**

At present the core priorities for policing in Wales are as follows:


- To ensure public protection and the protection of vulnerable persons through a joined up approach.
- To effectively counter terrorism, organised and major crime to ensure public safety across Wales.
- To ensure that neighbourhood policing is embedded and remains local.
- To promote joint working and collaboration both within the police service and with partners in local Government and the criminal justice system, including the private and voluntary sectors.
- To continue to engage with Central Government for sufficient funding to provide an efficient and effective police service in Wales.
- To raise the profiles of the police and their governing bodies and fully engage with the Welsh Government.

### **Police funding**

The funding arrangements are perhaps the most complex of all public sector services. This is in part due to the complexities surrounding governance and the structure of policing across England and Wales. Funding across both central Government and local Government is difficult enough. However, the fact that the Welsh Government also provides funding, along with almost 16 other sources, makes this multifaceted landscape of funding almost incomprehensible.

The main funding for police services within England and Wales comes from central Government. This accounts for 76 per cent of all police funding and comes directly from the Home Office, the Department of Communities and Local Government, and within Wales, the Welsh Government. Police authorities account for 24 per cent of funding, being raised through council tax. Specific grants, relating to issues safety and security account for 11 per cent of funding.

This funding distribution is illustrated in Figure 1 below. It is from this figure that 20 per cent savings must be made over the coming years leading up to 2014-15. The total expenditure in 2010-11 reached £13.02 billion.



However, following the election of the coalition Government in June 2010, an emergency budget was undertaken resulting in department's across Government losing £6.2 billion, of which £125 million came from savings in the police budget. This reduced police expenditure to £12.9 billion.

### Police spending in Wales

Policy responsibility for the police service in Wales is non-devolved and rests with the Home Office. However, funding for police authorities is provided through a three-way arrangement between the Home Office, the Welsh Government and council tax payers, as shown in the box below.

### Welsh police funding 2011-12

- The provisional Home Office 'core' funding for the four Welsh police authorities for 2011-12 totals **£232.7 million**.
- Two of the authorities (Dyfed Powys and North Wales) qualify for a 'top up' of **£13 million** of Home Office funding. Top up grants are calculated using many indicators including an assessment of student populations, employment figures and welfare claimants.
- The four police authorities will also, provisionally, receive **£14.7 million** from the Home Office for neighbourhood policing. This will come from the specific Grant scheme.
- Therefore total provisional funding for the four authorities from Westminster stands at **£260.4 million**.
- Welsh Government funding for the four police authorities for 2011-12 totals **£161m**.
- In total, the four police authorities will receive **£421.4 million** in UK central and Welsh Government revenue funding for 2011-12 (excluding anti-terror funding - which is not revealed)

Source: Home Office and Welsh Government.

### Devolved spending considerations for Wales

There are additional devolved spending areas that must be considered when evaluating expenditure on policing within Wales. As is highlighted throughout this paper, policing is a non-devolved area and dealt with by the coalition Government in Westminster. Having acknowledged this, the landscape of policing is complex, and often overlaps with devolved areas in which the Welsh Government has control. Because of this, some spending relating to devolved responsibilities must be recognised. These include spending on 'supporting communities and people' and 'safer communities'. Table 1 illustrates such spending, exploring some of the specific areas within both spending allocations.

**Table 1: Police spending distribution**

Devolved Spending Area	Example
Supporting Communities and People (£53m)	Financial Inclusion (£4.3m)
	Communities First (£40m)
Safer Communities (£44m)	Youth Justice (£4.9m)
	Domestic Abuse (£3.6m)
	Substance Misuse (£27.4m)

## **Community safety**

Community safety straddles the devolved and non devolved partnership landscape which makes the context for policing in Wales unique. The influence of the Welsh Government is seen to be as important as the Department for Communities and Local Government in England. In developing relations with partners, a significant benefit has arisen from the fact that a high proportion of elected Police Authority members are also senior Local Authority politicians. That seniority of representation also reflects the importance of the police element of the precept to local authorities and the Welsh Government.

Since 2006, there has developed an all-Wales approach to collaboration through the Police Authorities of Wales, which allowed for a flexible local, regional or national approach as required. The collaborative structure also enabled a quick response to the Welsh Government on issues where a single policing response was appropriate. As part of this collaborative approach to protective services, two organisations have been established:

- TARIAN – a Welsh Government funded operation involving the four Welsh police services to tackle organised drugs crime.
- the Wales Extremist and Counter Terrorism Unit.

These units recognised the fact that organised crime and terrorism require specific responses and they provide Welsh forces with a flexible level two capability.

In Wales there are currently four Welsh Local Criminal Justice Boards. Initially they were aligned to the criminal justice structure in Wales but in recent years many of the partners involved have moved to an all Wales structure. In consequence, consideration is currently being given to establishing a strategic all Wales Criminal Justice Board.

## **Current police arrangements**

Whilst policing is non-devolved, the four Welsh police forces have strong links with the Welsh Government. They have a permanent police presence with the Welsh Government in the form of two seconded officers, a superintendent and an inspector, who make up the Police Liaison Team.

The Police Liaison Team provides a single point of contact with the four Welsh forces. They work close with the Community Safety Division and engage on police and community safety related matters with officials from across Welsh Government and the National Assembly.

The team operates on a number of levels but allows for an all-Wales response on particular issues that may involve policing. For example, each Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Wales officer has responsibility for particular areas such as community safety or transport. The police liaison team makes arrangements for ACPO members to have access to the relevant minister in order for a police input and advice on certain matters. The unit mainly interacts with the civil service in achieving these objectives.

## **Possible future arrangements**

Any devolution of police powers to the Welsh Government will necessitate an increase in the number of staff required to maintain and enhance the links with the current four police forces. In turn the Welsh Government would need a Minister responsible for policing. This position would require substantial civil service support beyond existing civil service capacity. The current police unit

would also need to be expanded to deal with the day-to-day issues surrounding the legal and other requirements of administering a devolved police service. This is more likely with the introduction of the Police and Crime Commissioners in November 2012.

Should policing be devolved to the Welsh Government governance and accountability structures would need to be considered carefully. One of the cornerstones on the current policing arrangements in this country revolves around the operational independence of the Chief Officer of police and particularly political influence upon such independence. In Scotland for example, where control of the police is devolved, a balance has been struck between the Chief Officer of Police and the Minister for Policing to prevent direct political interference.

Any future arrangement involving a Minister for Police and the four Police and Crime Commissioners in Wales could be a cause for concern. It will be quite possible for all four commissioners and the policing minister to be from the same political party. A consequence could be the exertion of political influence from above and alongside Chief Officers within any tripartite accountability arrangements.

### **Major legislation underpinning accountable policing in England and Wales**

Over the past 50 years many Acts of Parliament have introduced measures concerning policing in England and Wales. However, this section will concentrate on those that have had major bearings upon the accountability and governance structures of policing in England and Wales.

#### **The Police Act 1964**

This introduced the current (until November 2012) accountability arrangements for policing in England and Wales, namely the tripartite structure, comprising the Chief Constable, the Home Office and the Police Authority. Differing power dynamics between the Police Authority and the Chief Constable, combined with an understandable reluctance on the part of those without specialist knowledge to make decisions, probably explains why power appeared to become concentrated in the hands of Chief Constables. This was despite later changes introduced by the introduction of the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 and may go some way to explain the forthcoming introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners.

#### **The Local Government Act 1972**

This provided measures for the alignment of police forces with the newly created structure of local government and eventually resulted in the formation of 43 separate police forces each with its own police authority.

#### **The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984**

Following the Scarman report into the 1981 disturbances in Brixton (Scarman 1981), a Home Office circular recommended the establishment of local consultative committees to improve discussion and communication between local police commanders and the people in their areas. These became statutory requirements under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). Arrangements of a similar type continue under the present system. However PACE was seen as having much greater accountability in the form of legal regulation regarding the application of police powers.

### **The Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994**

This introduced a number of major reforms to the tripartite system (later consolidated into the Police Act 1996) within a framework of national planning and performance management. Under this Act, Police Authorities became independent bodies, set apart from the local Government structure, and tasked to provide for an efficient and effective police force. Funding came from local taxation, through a precept on the council tax. Since this change, the proportion of police funding paid by council tax precepts has continued to rise substantially.

In addition, the Act restricted the size of most Police Authorities to 17 members, consisting of nine councillors, three magistrates and five independent members who have significant local involvement. In particular the Act allowed for the following:

- Police Authorities have to publish an annual plan, which includes local and national objectives along with associated performance targets.
- Chief Constables were given responsibility to 'direct and control' their police forces. This involved taking over the responsibility for detailed management of their staff, including civilian employees, and for setting the annual budget.
- Chief Constables were employed on fixed term contracts and the Home Office was provided with a number of additional powers regarding performance targets, setting minimum budgets for forces.
- The Home Secretary also had greater powers to amalgamate police forces.

### **The Crime and Disorder Act 1998**

This placed a statutory duty upon Local Authorities for crime and disorder reduction and required the establishment of local multi-agency Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships in England and Community Safety Partnerships in Wales. The Act defines 'responsible authorities' which have a statutory duty to work with other local agencies and organisations to implement strategies to tackle crime and disorder. Following a review during 2006, performance management was introduced in which the former three yearly crime and disorder audit was replaced by an ongoing rolling audit based on a six monthly review. Audits are now refreshed annually.

### **The Police Reform Act 2002**

In terms of police governance, this Act is seen as being of great significance. The Act introduced the following measures:

- An annual policing plan setting out central Governments strategic priorities for policing and requiring Police Authorities to produce a three year strategy consistent with the National policing Plan.
- Increased powers for the Home Secretary to introduce good practice countrywide through statutory codes of practice and to make regulations regarding governing police procedures.
- Powers for the Home Secretary to require a police force to take remedial action where they are judged by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary to be inefficient or ineffective.
- Strengthening Police Authority's powers to require the early departure or to suspend a Chief Constable in the public interest.

The Act also enabled Chief Officers to designate Police Authority support staff as 'Community Support Officers', investigating officers, detention officers or escort officers in order to support police officers.

#### **The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005**

This established the Serious Organised Crime Agency which brought together the National Crime Squad, the National Criminal Intelligence Service, the part of HM Revenue and Customs that dealt with drug trafficking and associate corporate finance and the part of the UK Immigration Service that dealt with organised crime.

#### **The Police and Justice Act 2006**

This changed the composition of Police Authorities in an attempt to enhance their democratic legitimacy. The category of magistrate membership was abolished with most Police Authorities now consisting of nine elected councillors and eight independent members. The Act also amended the powers of Police Authorities to hold the Chief Constable to account as well as the persons under her/his control.

#### **The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011**

This introduced numerous changes relating to licensing, demonstrations, drugs misuse, police structure and governance. It abolished the tripartite system of governance within England and Wales by replacing Police Authorities with elected individuals known as Police and Crime Commissioners. This change is discussed later in the report.

It is noteworthy that no legislation that has been introduced specifically for policing within Wales.

### **Accountability: present and future**

#### **England and Wales- the Tripartite System of police accountability**

The current system of holding the 43 forces of England and Wales accountable has been characterised as the tripartite structure of police accountability, shown in Table 2.

**Table 2: Tripartite System of Police Governance**

<b>Home Secretary/Home Office</b>	<b>Local Police Authority</b>	<b>Chief Constable</b>
Determines key national policing objectives. Presents annual policing plan to Parliament.	Responsible for maintaining an effective and efficient force.	Responsible for direction and control of the force.
Sets police performance targets. Requires a police force to take remedial action if found inefficient or ineffective.	Determines local policing priorities. Produces a three-year strategy consistent with national policing plan.	Drafts local policing plan in conjunction with local Police Authority. Responsible for achieving local and national policing objectives.
Determines cash grant to Police Authorities.	Determines arrangements for public consultation.	Responsible for resource allocation.
Approves appointment of Chief Constables.	Precepting body for budgeting and resource allocation.	Chief Constable and Deputy/ Assistant Chief Constables on fixed term contracts.
Issues statutory codes of practice and directions to Police Authorities.	Responsible for appointment and dismissal of Chief Constable.	
Has authority to order amalgamations.	Can require suspension or early dismissal on public interest grounds.	
	Membership of 17.	

Established by the 1964 Police Act which followed the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police, the tripartite system remains the fundamental basis of police governance. It distributes responsibilities between the Home Office, the local Police Authority, and the Chief Constable of the force. Subsequent legislation has endorsed the tripartite arrangements.

The system provides accountability to Parliament through the Home Secretary who sets key priorities within a National Policing Plan. Accountability is through the local Police Authorities, comprising elected local councillors, magistrates and business representatives nominated by a central panel. In practice, Chief Constables also respond to Whitehall policies and circulars. Arguably, the autonomy of Chief Constables is limited by the current arrangements, although case law has made it clear that the police are the servants of the law in terms of their operational discretion, and are not subject to administrative or political direction.

One intention of the 1994 Police and Magistrates Courts Act was to strengthen the role of local Police Authorities by giving them additional powers, including involvement in developing local policing plans.

However, the 2002 Police Reform Act moved greater power towards the centre as a result of the introduction of the Home Secretary's rolling three year National Policing Plan. Table 2 shows the current balance of powers and the respective responsibilities of the tripartite structure.

**Police and Crime Commissioners**

As discussed earlier, in November 2012 the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 replaces Police Authorities with the elected position of Police and Crime Commissioners (Home Office 2010a). In addition, an independent police and crime panel and a new National Crime Agency were created.

One of the primary stated objectives of the reforms is to increase understanding and participation in policing by reconnecting the public with the police. Under the new revised system, the Police Authority has been replaced within the tri-partite system to include instead a Police and Crime Commissioner for each police force excluding London (Home Office 2010b). The main functions of the Commissioners are:

- Holding the Chief Officer to account by ensuring the priorities set by the wider public are achieved. It will be for the Commissioner to ensure that maximum efficiency, effectiveness and economic viability is attained.
- Engage with and represent local communities within the force area.
- Set the policing budget and the precept (the proportion of council tax that is spent on policing).
- Appoint the Chief Constable.
- Where necessary dismiss the Chief Constable.

Although the role of the Commissioners is similar to the responsibilities of the Police Authorities, one of the significant differences is that the Commissioner will have the power to dismiss Chief Officers. It is hoped that the introduction of directly elected Commissioners will stimulate engagement and raise awareness by becoming more transparent and ultimately more accountable and accessible to the public.

The only difference between Police and Crime Commissioners in England and those in Wales lies in the fact that as Community Safety is the remit of the Welsh Government, Commissioners in Wales have a duty to report to the Welsh Minister responsible for this portfolio.

### **Scotland**

At present there are eight police forces in Scotland. However, under the forthcoming Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act, during 2013 there will be a single amalgamated and devolved police force, known as The Police Service of Scotland accountable to:

- The Scottish Police Authority
- The Scottish Ministers
- The Chief Constable

In part this emulates the tripartite system in England and Wales, but allows for the operational independence of the Chief Officer of police not to be compromised by one political party.

### **Northern Ireland**

Here devolution is slightly different to Scotland and Wales, with Government powers divided into three categories: transferred, reserved and excepted. In March 2010, an agreement was passed to transfer powers of justice and policing to Northern Ireland. Reserved powers - which could be transferred in the future with cross-community consent - include prisons and civil defence.

### **The Strategic Policing Requirement**

The Strategic Policing Requirement has been produced by the Home Office to inform police forces and police authority's plans for 2012-13 with the intention of improving relations during the transition

period from Police Authorities to Police and Crime Commissioners. From November 2012 Chief Constables will be held to account for the totality of their policing, not just local but also national. The national threats identified by Strategic Policing Requirement are listed in Table 3.

Should any of these materialise it is up to the Police and Crime Commissioners to ensure the Chief Constable has in place plans for an appropriate response. The Strategic Policing Requirement will undoubtedly have implications for any form of devolved policing to Wales, both internally and externally.

**Table 3: National threats**

Threat	Risk
Terrorism	Which the National security Risk assessment recognises as a tier 1 risk.
Civil Emergencies	Identified as a tier 1 risk and requires an aggregated response across police force boundaries.
Organised Crime	Recognised as a tier 2 risk. Large-scale cyber crime, border security and economic crime may have an organised crime dimension as well as financially motivated organised crime.
Public Order	These incidents that cannot be managed by a single force acting alone and require mutual aid to ensure that the peace is maintained, as well as facilitating peaceful protest.
Large Scale Cyber Incident	This has been identified as a tier 1 risk and could include a criminal attack upon a financial institution or where many people or businesses across the UK are targeted.
Major Events	These may impact upon policing requirements, for example, the 2012 Olympic games, which has implications for crime and policing.

### **Arguments for devolving police powers**

The following summarises the arguments elicited during interviews for this paper in support of devolving police powers to the Welsh Government:

#### **Closer co-operation**

The police service and partnerships generally work better in Wales than in England by those interviewed. In part this may be due to Wales being geographically smaller. In addition, it was suggested that Local Authorities, the Police, and the Welsh Government place more importance on the notion of partnership working.

#### **Opportunity to redesign services**

Devolution of policing powers was seen as catalyst for change in the way the delivery of other public

services involved in community safety not just the police. It was suggested that redesigning service delivery would improve the effectiveness, efficiency and economic viability of Welsh police forces and their partner agencies such as local authorities. In particular, reference was made to the role of the new Police and Crime Commissioners who have been given the responsibility for overseeing the whole of the delivery of the partnership approach to policing, and who are not just focused upon the police organisation. This may also afford an opportunity to streamline Local Authority provision in a regional format aligned to police provision. For example, the rationalising of local service boards to coincide with police boundaries may be an efficient way of achieving this.

### **Criminal justice system alignment**

It was considered that devolving other criminal justice agencies to the Welsh national level would achieve a more efficient delivery of services. All of those interviewed foresaw problems in devolving police services to the Welsh Government so long as other agencies within the criminal justice remained non- devolved. Devolving the system as a whole would achieve much greater 'joined up' service delivery, closer links to the community, together with an increased emphasis on localism.

In the meantime it was emphasised that any delay in the alignment with other criminal justice agencies should not stand in the way of devolution of police powers to the Welsh Government. As one respondent put it, if function was established first, then the form or structure required for delivery would naturally follow.

### **Improved communication and accountability**

Devolving police powers to the Welsh Government would result in it becoming better informed about the complexities of policing. Currently there are too few experts within the Government specialising in policing. If policing were devolved a Minister would provide a single point of contact and greater access for the force to policy-making. It flowed from that that there would be a more efficient delivery of the service than can be achieved under the present situation where Chief Police Officers in Wales have to deal with the Home Office in London. In general the consensus was that devolving of policing powers would lead to improved communication and accountability between the police, other agencies and the Welsh Government.

### **Improved service delivery reflecting local needs**

Interviewees felt that devolving policing powers to the Welsh Government would provide for closer links to the community, with a greater 'joined up' approach to dealing with locally identified problems. The ongoing collaboration between Welsh forces supported by the Welsh Government was highlighted as being very positive. Identifying local problems and needs, and obtaining funding from the Welsh Government, had already been successful. For example, Operation TARIAN, funded by the Welsh Government, had been extremely successful in tackling illegal drug activities across Wales.

### **Potential drawbacks in devolving police powers**

Despite the positive comments highlighted above, a number of potential drawbacks to devolving policing powers were highlighted:

#### **Funding**

Given the climate economic austerity, there were concerns about funding. Interviewees were

worried about the priority Welsh Government would give to policing. Within its current budget, the Welsh Government naturally places more importance upon health and education than it does on policing. There were also concerns about how the Welsh Government would relate to the new Police and Crime Commissioners who also have responsibility for ensuring adequate funding for the police through setting a precept on the council tax.

### **National and international commitments**

Welsh police forces currently have an arrangement with their English counterparts for mutual aid, which will be carried forward following the introduction of the Strategic Policing Requirement. Police officers from Welsh police forces are seconded to UK and international policing organisations and assist in tackling global organised crime and terrorism. Interviewees expressed concern about how these arrangements would work if powers were devolved to the Welsh Government.

### **Impact on criminal justice processes**

Several interviewees expressed concerns regarding the possible impact upon the process of delivering criminal justice in Wales should policing powers be devolved. In particular, it was felt that if funding were not adequate then the court system might not function as efficiently as it should, and that the partnership approach may suffer from underfunding.

### **Conclusion**

In general there was support devolution of police powers to the Welsh Government from the majority of agencies and individuals interviewed as part of this research. There was concern about the capacity of the Welsh Government to deal with the administration, governance and accountability that would be required. The position of a Policing Minister within the Welsh Cabinet would need to be created and the accountability and role of Police and Crime Commissioners would need to be clarified.

There were concerns, too, that funding for a devolved police service in Wales would be insufficient. Any move to devolve policing powers should include an adequate commitment to funding. In addition, the importance of the police role within the Welsh Government, compared with established Welsh Government functions such as health and education, would need to be clearly identified.

It is recommended that a close study should be made of the forthcoming changes to policing in Scotland. Despite the history of devolution being different to that of Wales, the structure for accountability and governance of the new national force for Scotland may provide a basis for a framework for any future arrangements in Wales. In particular, the use of a Police Authority made up of diverse members may remove any particular problem of interference with the operational independence of Chief Officers.

## **Appendix A: contacted organisations**

In preparing this report, the following methodologies were employed:

1. Unstructured interviews were held with a number of prominent individuals representing stakeholders within the police organisation, as well as others within the criminal justice system within Wales.
2. In depth literature review was conducted regarding governance and accountability processes in relation to policing in England and Wales.

During the research for this paper it became clear that many individuals and agencies that could have taken the opportunity to provide their views would not engage in the process. Despite being disappointing, this is quite an important finding. It demonstrates the strength of the current tripartite system which means that any move to change the current accountability process may meet with some considerable opposition. Further, it highlights the political sensitivity of the subject under discussion, especially in the light of the fact that many agencies are currently preparing evidence for the Silk Commission.

Many individuals contacted were reluctant to discuss the topic, or would not respond despite several attempts at contacting via e-mail and telephone. Several initially agreed to be interviewed only to cancel soon after. Several who were interviewed wished their comments to be 'non-attributable' but were keen to provide their views. Others were quite open regarding their opinions. The list of organisations and agencies initially contacted for consultation is as follows (**bold** indicates those who engaged in the consultation process):

**Association of Chief Police Officers (Cymru)**

**Magistrates Association (Wales)**

Crown Prosecution Service (Wales)

**Police Superintendents Association (Wales)**

**Police Federation (Wales)**

Community Safety Unit, Welsh Government

**Welsh Association of Community Safety Organisations**

Police Authorities of Wales

**Police Liaison Unit, Welsh Government**

Potential Police and Crime Commissioners

## **Appendix B: glossary of police terminology**

(BTP) British Transport Police  
(CNC) Civil Nuclear Constabulary  
(CSPs) Community Safety Partnerships  
(CSOs) Community Support Officers'  
(CDRPs) Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships  
(HMIC) Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary  
(HMRC) HM Revenue and Customs  
(MOD) Ministry of Defence  
(NCA) National Crime Agency  
(PCCs) Police and Crime Commissioners  
(PACE) Police and Criminal Evidence Act  
(PAW) Police Authorities for Wales  
(PMCA) Police and Magistrates Courts Act  
(PSNI) The Police Service of Northern Ireland  
(SOCA) Serious Organised Crime Agency  
(SPR) Strategic Policing Requirement  
(TARIAN) Welsh Government funded operation involving the four Welsh police services to tackle organised drugs crime  
(WECTU) Wales Extremist and Counter Terrorism Unit  
(WG) Welsh Government

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