


Chapter 8

The European influence in Wales

Francesca Dickson





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Introduction

This paper is based on a series of interviews with ten individuals closely engaged with the development of European Union policy in Cardiff Bay. In addition a comprehensive review was undertaken of official documentation, as well as a variety of literature on multi-level governance, paradiplomacy and inter-governmental relations. The paper focuses on the following issues:

- The ability of the Welsh Government to engage effectively with government at the UK level
- Constitutional anomalies arising from what has been called the 'Bridgend question', due to UK Ministers speaking on matters that are wholly devolved to Wales
- The effectiveness of the National Assembly in scrutinising the Welsh Government's EU-related activities
- The ability of the National Assembly to maintain a strategic approach to the EU in the absence of a specialised committee.

In the course of preparing the paper, several themes that were raised that have been cited elsewhere in work commissioned by the Changing Union project. In particular, concerns were expressed regarding the size of the National Assembly, the role of the media, the capacity of some civil society groups, and the attitude of the UK Government towards Wales under conditions of party-political incongruence.

EU legislation

The Government of Wales Act 2006 makes it clear that any EU obligation of the UK Government is a Welsh obligation where it applies to devolved functions; and thus Wales must ensure that it is in compliance with all relevant European legislation. The concordat on EU policy issues specifies that any financial costs and penalties imposed by the EU for failure to implement legislation will be borne by the devolved administration. Wales has three main responsibilities as regards European legislation:

1. Implementing EU directives made in areas within its competence.
2. Complying with all EU laws that come within the scope of the National Assembly's legislative powers and the functions of Welsh Ministers.
3. Subsidiarity monitoring - reporting any issues to the Westminster Parliament.

There are three types of European legislation that Wales is required to implement: regulations,

directives and decisions. Alongside these legislative instruments, the EU is also able to issue non-binding instruments such as recommendations and opinions, which are classed as 'non-legislative acts', despite the fact that they can, in fact, be legislative, that is to say, broadly corresponding to secondary legislation. The number of non-legislative acts vastly outweighs that of legislative acts, and they thus form an important part of the broader regulatory environment within which Wales operates (National Assembly for Wales, 2011).

Estimates on the percentage of national legislation which is 'Europeanized' vary wildly. Some commentators have suggested that across the EU as a whole, the figure is somewhere between 60-80 per cent. However, more recent, detailed studies have shown that between 1997 and 2009, within the UK, 6.8 per cent of primary legislation and 14.1 per cent of secondary legislation "had a role in implementing EU obligations, although the degree of involvement varied from passing reference to explicit implementation" (House of Commons, 2010).

Accurate data for Wales is not readily accessible. But, given the extent of Wales's powers over key EU areas such as agriculture, the UK figure for secondary legislation (14.1 per cent) is likely to be the baseline for the amount of Welsh legislation with European origins, with the potential for this figure to be higher for that very reason. Data from the Committee of the Regions demonstrates that roughly 70 per cent of European legislation has a direct regional and local impact, which goes some way to demonstrating the interest that regional governments have in the European policy process.

It is not possible within the scope of this paper to list the European legislation that impacts on the policy areas being considered by the Changing Union project. Suffice it to say, however, that there is a pronounced European dimension to transport, policing, energy and broadcasting, although not of welfare. As emerged from the expert seminars held to examine the other papers in this study, there are examples of this influence in the following fields:

- Transport, where minimum safety standards are determined largely at the European level.
- Broadcasting, where EU state-aid legislation may limit the scope for some interventions in public-service broadcasting.¹
- Agriculture, where there are numerous European directives and regulations related to the CAP.

Funding

Wales has a significant interest in a number of European funding streams. The most valuable of these come under the banner of structural funds, which encompass the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund. The delivery of EU structural funds programmes is managed by the Wales European Funding Office (WEFO), now embedded within the Welsh Government.

As of the 31st October 2012, a total of 275 projects have been awarded EU funds amounting to £1.8 billion, which, when match funding is included, represents a total investment of £3.72 billion. As the only remaining regions with eligibility under the EU's convergence Objective '1' criteria are Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, and West Wales and the Valleys, the Welsh Government has a sizeable incentive to ensure continued support for this funding stream at the EU level. It is not surprising, therefore, that it has been particularly active in the lead-up to the negotiations over the next multi-annual financial framework (MFF) and separate negotiations over reform of the EU's cohesion policy.²

In addition to the structural funds, Wales receives funding from the CAP to a tune of roughly £400 million per annum. Certainly there is a high level of dependency on this funding in rural Wales. In 2009, the single farm payment accounted for around 80 per cent of all farm income in these areas.

Other competitive funding schemes have been utilised by the Welsh Government: for example, Wales has an interest in Horizon 2020, the Connecting Europe facility and the framework research programme (under which Wales secured £33 million under the first three years of the 2007-13 programme).

There are important questions to be asked about the way that these funds have been used by Wales, and indeed the prospects for such funding to be secured in future given the UK Government's stance over the EU budget. These questions are largely beyond the scope of this paper, but would benefit from a separate study, particularly considering the broader questions around the Welsh Government's record on economic development. Additionally, a report by Rhodri Glyn Thomas, member of the Committee of the Regions, on achieving greater synergy between sub-state, member state and EU budgets was published in November 2012.³

Other stakeholders

Committee of the Regions and European Economic and Social Committee: This has an advisory function only, issuing around 50 'opinions' a year and conducting numerous stakeholder consultations and events. Wales has four members: two Assembly Members, Rhodri Glyn Thomas (Plaid Cymru) and Christine Chapman (Labour), and two members from the Welsh Local Government Association. The Committee has a broad remit, acting as an advocate for Europe's regions and ensuring a regional voice is communicated at the early stages of EU policy formation. It also has a key role with regards subsidiarity monitoring. The European Economic and Social Committee represents civil society and the private sector, having been established as a forum to discuss issues relating to the single market, with representatives nominated by the National Assembly.

MEPs: Wales has four MEPS (representing the Conservatives, Labour, Plaid Cymru and UKIP), who are its only directly elected representatives at the EU. They were regularly asked to give evidence and updates regarding their work in the Parliament to the former European and External Affairs Committee of the National Assembly. It is not clear how frequently similar meetings will take place now that the Committee has ceased to exist. However, there has been an effort on the part of the Presiding Officer to establish a link between MEPs and Committee Chairs in the Assembly.

European Commission Office in Wales: This office was established in Cardiff in 1975, following the European referendum of that year, and is the political representation of the European Commission in Wales. It has a key role in communicating the aims of the Commission to Welsh audiences and working to improve its links with Welsh institutions.

Civil Society: There are questions regarding the capacity and effectiveness of Welsh civil society to engage with Europe. Cardiff does not benefit from the same 'international' environment and supporting institutions that, for example, Edinburgh does, for example in terms of foreign consulates and embassies. Perhaps more importantly, the lack of a European Parliament representation, as exists in Edinburgh and London, impacts on the Assembly's avenues for engaging with Europe, given the executive-dominance in other inter-governmental structures. Overall, this results in a lower-profile for European issues. On the other hand, Wales' attitudes towards Europe are arguably much more positive than those found in England, with the number of European information offices in Wales evidence of this desire for engagement.

Some organisations are exceptionally well briefed when it comes to European issues, including (the Farming Union of Wales, the Welsh Local Government Association - which maintains its own Brussels

office - and the WCVA). On the other hand others are almost entirely unaware of the avenues for policy influence at the European level or the relevant implications of EU policy for their field.

Overall, the private sector in Wales is largely notable for its absence from engagement with the European dimension. Yet, given the increasing importance of European markets in terms of trade, this is an area that needs to be developed. The media's lack of European coverage is also seen as a blockage in the wider engagement of Welsh society in EU affairs (though, of course, this is also a UK-wide issue).

Strategies for influencing EU Policy

The legitimacy of a Welsh interest in EU policy was acknowledged in the White Paper on Welsh devolution in 1997. Since that point the Welsh Government and the National Assembly have developed a fairly 'bold' approach towards engaging with the EU, particularly in terms of establishing direct relationships with European institutions. Broadly speaking, both the Welsh Government and the National Assembly (at political and official levels) are euro-friendly bodies, and there is a general degree of interest in and awareness of the European dimension to Welsh issues amongst Ministers and Assembly Members. This was typified by a large number of visits to Brussels in the first year of the Fourth Assembly.

Welsh Government

No single European portfolio has been created within the Welsh Government. In practice, coordination of European-related policy fell to the office of the First Minister, where it remains today (Cole and Palmer, 2011:383). In addition to this overarching strategic role, the Deputy Minister for Agriculture and European Programmes has a more targeted European remit, with responsibility for CAP and cohesion policy.

At official level, the European and External Affairs Division houses a European Policy Unit, which, together with the Brussels Office, coordinates the Welsh Government's approach to EU affairs. The role of the Welsh Government's Brussels Office is predominately one of direct engagement with European institutions, while officials in Cardiff maintain a closer focus on influencing the UK's position on European Policy.

Since 2009, the Welsh Government has produced an annual European Strategy, the most recent of which was published in May 2012.⁴ However, questions persist as to how substantive it is. There is no universal agreement on the effect that the document has had on the Government's approach to EU affairs. Within the strategy a clear effort has been made to cohere Wales' European strategy with the Europe 2020 agenda. Beyond this, two main priorities can be identified: influencing the development of policies important to Wales, and raising Wales' profile within the EU.

The Welsh Government's Brussels Office is particularly active with regards to the first priority and works closely both with the National Assembly's representation in Wales House, and also UKRep. Early intervention (at policy formation stages) was widely cited in interviews as part of the background research for this paper as a key factor in the likelihood of Welsh policy preferences being successfully incorporated into European legislation; there was some suggestion that there is greater scope for such influence before an official UK 'line' had been established.

The objective of raising Wales' profile within Europe is, in turn, linked with the aim of influencing EU policy, but there also appears to be a desire to demonstrate Wales' credentials as a progressive, outward looking young democracy.

While it is difficult to make an overall assessment of the effectiveness of the Welsh Government in directly influencing European policy making, and its capacity to reap the full benefit of Wales' membership of the EU, there are certain areas where Wales is particularly active, and is held in high regard by European officials, including:

- Cohesion policy - WEFO's 'simplification agenda' in particular was cited as an initiative that made it to the European 'stage'.
- The environment.
- Agriculture, where the farming connect service was highlighted, while the CAP generally is an area where there is considerable expertise within Wales).

The National Assembly

Prior to the Fourth Assembly in 2011, a European Committee and subsequently a European and External Affairs Committee had been the focal point within the National Assembly for examining developments within the EU, scrutinising the Welsh Government's European activities and pursuing key proposals. However, a restructuring of the National Assembly's Committee system led to its dissolution in 2011, with European issues being 'mainstreamed' across the Assembly as a whole, in conjunction with the new Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee; a fairly "radical" departure from the status quo ante.

There are potential problems with this new approach. Firstly, the lengthy remit of the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee necessarily limits the time and resources dedicated specifically to EU issues. Secondly, mainstreaming the responsibility for European policy to the five 'thematic' committees of the Assembly, and to their members jointly could prove problematic. EU matters are often highly technical. Predicting the future implications of policy, and understanding how to convey Welsh preferences to the European level is not a straightforward process. Indeed, these dangers have been recognised in the approach of the Scottish Parliament. In 'mainstreaming' its EU capacity, it has designated individual EU 'reporters' on all of its subject committees to augment the work of its European and External Relations Committee.

The initial experience of the National Assembly's new system has been somewhat mixed. On the one-hand, the subject committees have been extremely active in pursuing the European dimensions of their remits. The level of expertise developed in some areas, in particular the CAP, has genuinely surprised some observers. In fact, with regards to the CAP, it was noted that the degree of Wales' direct input at the EU level meant that the process could be seen to resemble one of co-legislating. Similarly, there appears to be a sincere interest in EU affairs at both official and political levels across the Assembly. Certainly at official level, European issues have become firmly embedded across the institution as a whole.

Moreover, in some respects the new system appears to have rationalised the Assembly's European engagement, with the subsidiarity protocol now lying much more clearly within the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, and other thematic concerns being handled by the appropriate subject committee. Related to this rationalisation was the feeling that there was now much less temptation to 'pass the buck' on European issues, and that consequently greater engagement was reached across the Assembly.

An internal review of the National Assembly has also found that the mainstreaming approach is perceived to be functioning smoothly. However, any assessment of the level of activity witnessed within the Assembly must come with a caveat: this has been a particularly busy time for a whole host of issues that most directly affect Wales, and the new system was very much 'thrown in at the deep-end'. A good deal of attention was paid to ensuring that the subject committees were aware of their enhanced role, not least to head-off external criticism from those opposed to the new structure.

On the other hand, there remain a number of outstanding issues, which may represent ongoing problems. Now that the policy-influencing stage of these activities is coming to an end, will there be less urgency to interactions with the EU? There are concerns, from almost all corners, that the strategic engagement which was a feature of the European and External Affairs committee's approach may not be maintained in its absence.

As it stands, much of this work (in terms of forward-planning) is being carried out by the Assembly's Brussels office, which in itself represents one of the more novel features of the Assembly's approach to European engagement. The National Assembly is the only regional legislature in the UK to maintain a representation. It is difficult to dispute the fact that this office has been a proactive force in terms of Wales' influence on European policy. In many respects, it also fulfills the coordinating role previously occupied by the European and External Affairs Committee.

The National Assembly's scrutiny of EU affairs is also an area where relatively informal structures predominate. Indeed, there does not appear to be an equivalent level of emphasis, on the part of individual AMs or committees, placed on scrutiny of the Welsh Government's European activities as exists in the Scottish context. The 'model' that European scrutiny follows in Wales is qualitatively different from that which exists in Scotland and at Westminster. In Wales, the importance of other roles, such as encouraging participation and debate around European issues, and contributing directly to the EU policy process, is more easily evidenced in Assembly documentation than its European scrutiny process.

Two potential avenues for improving the ability of the Assembly to scrutinise European issues have been suggested. The first was the new Committee for the Scrutiny of the First Minister, which was established in May 2012. The Committee met for the first time in November 2012, and is chaired by the Deputy Presiding Officer, David Melding. European issues are logically part of this new committee's remit, and two issues have emerged as potential future scrutiny topics:

1. International relations and promoting Wales abroad, including relations with the UK government.
2. Future European funding and relationships with Europe and the UK Government.

Quite how effective this committee will be is difficult to foresee. It will depend to a large extent on the pro-activity of the committee members. However, the fact that the committee is due to meet only once a term, combined with its lengthy remit, necessarily limits its European focus.

A second avenue for scrutiny is to use plenary sessions to hold the Welsh Government to account on European matters. However, this has happened rarely to date.

Inter-governmental relations

The current mechanisms for intergovernmental relations are largely informal and un-codified, reflecting the nature of the relationship between Whitehall and the Welsh Office pre-devolution. But there is no

doubt that European issues loom large. Guidelines are laid out in a concordat on the EU, enumerating specific procedures for the Welsh interest to be incorporated into the UK's European policy. These include scope for Welsh ministers to attend Council meetings as part of the UK representation.

In addition, JMC(E) is by far the most frequently used joint ministerial committee, and was the first to be used consistently to fulfil its proper function. In the words of one participant, this reflected the fact that there was "a real need to be met" (Gallagher, 2012:201).

The key channel of influence for Wales in the EU arena has traditionally been through direct dealings with the UK government. From a comparative perspective, the devolved regions have a high degree of access to the UK's EU policy making machinery, although this access is also highly conditional (Bulmer et al., 2006). The political incongruence between Wales and Westminster since 2010 therefore poses a threat to such access. Inter-party relations represented a key mechanism for the devolved regions to communicate their policy preferences to the UK government, and from there to the EU (Cole and Palmer, 2011:384). In the context of largely informal mechanisms of inter-government relations, the loss of this influence may be felt particularly acutely.

This is a double-edged-sword for the Welsh government. Not only are Wales' EU policy preferences likely to increasingly diverge from those of the UK under the current government formations, but they are also unable to use informal, intra-party links to influence EU policy development in London. This situation was publically highlighted by Carwyn Jones in a speech to the London School of Economics in November 2012.⁵

It should be noted that both academic and practitioner opinion is divided over the extent of the challenge to Wales' EU policy capacity by governmental incongruence (Cole and Palmer, 2011:386). However, there is evidence to suggest that the challenge is indeed a significant one. Recent comments by Carwyn Jones, identifying a 'Bridgend problem', mark a departure from the norm of 'behind-closed-doors' dispute resolution. The First Minister perceived an inconsistency in the situation that, in areas wholly devolved to Wales, such as agriculture, it was (by implication) the de facto English Minister who represented the UK's position in EU negotiations. Both the nature of the problem identified, and the way in which it was publicly articulated, are significant indications that inter-government relations over EU matters have altered. Alongside full incongruence since 2010, the implications of the successful 2011 referendum have also contributed to this new scenario.

There has been a "marked deterioration" in Wales-UK inter-government relations as a whole in the wake of full incongruence, one that is particularly manifest at the political, as opposed to the official level (Wyn Jones and Royles, 2012). An example of this deterioration in the EU domain was seen in the very public reaction by administrations in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland to David Cameron's veto of a recent EU treaty. For instance, Carwyn Jones argued that, in the decision making process leading up to the summit, the UK central government had sidelined Wales, and that as a result Wales' "national interest" was harmed.⁶ A similar theme was articulated by the First Minister in November 2012, when he lamented the prospect of a referendum on EU membership as proposed by Conservative MPs.⁷

There is a fairly broad recognition that there is, indeed, an issue with regards to relations between both the Assembly and Welsh Government and the UK Government (though relations with other legislatures throughout the UK, including the Westminster parliament, were deemed to be 'very good'). In particular, it appears that the Treasury is increasingly adopting a policing role with regards to the activities of devolved governments in European matters. Having said this, there was also a view that the UK government were aware of the potential for problems under incongruence, and

have been careful to adopt a positive attitude towards the devolved institutions in formal settings. Indeed, it seems that incremental improvements are being made in this regard. It is possible that the public reaction by devolved administrations to the lack of consultation around the EU veto in December 2011 was a spur to greater engagement.

There have been instances where Wales has been successful in influencing the UK's position on EU issues, for example over the protection and promotion of minority languages or cohesion policy (Cole and Palmer, 2011:84). However, this has tended to be in relatively uncontroversial cases, where the UK government has little interest. Given that Wales now has a far greater degree of domestic legislative competence, and in the context both of full political incongruence and a climate of austerity, there may well be increasing instances where the policy preferences and raw interests of the Welsh and UK governments differ more fundamentally. Indeed, the structural funds are now a good example.

Without any changes to the formal structures of inter-government relations - which, in any event are 'binding in honour' only, and not legally enforceable - this may have serious implications for Wales' ability to achieve its European policy objectives. Essentially, Welsh input into the UK's EU policy is premised on the goodwill of both governments (Bulmer et al., 2006:86). This was a condition that was met much more easily in the relatively benign climate that typified the years leading up to 2010.⁸

A comparative perspective

Europe

Wales has a relatively high degree of influence as a region of the EU based on its traditional level of access to the UK government. It is also influenced by European policy to a considerable extent, due to its degree of legislative competence as a 'constitutional' region. Official competence over EU policy is very rarely devolved to the regional level in European Member States. Nonetheless, almost all European regions have sought out a presence in Brussels. Indeed, the UK and Belgian regions boast a privileged position in Brussels, being the only European regions with full diplomatic accreditation (Tatham, 2012:66).

Even in regions with the most extensive competencies (such as in Belgium, where regions are "compelled" by the Federal constitution to manage their own external relations, including at the EU level (Criekemans, 2010:2-3)), the nature of EU policy making ensures that, in practice, such competencies are relatively constrained in comparison to wider international relations.

England and the English regions

There is a sizeable gap between the level of devolved activity at the European level, and the representation of English regions, with the possible exception of the Greater London Authority. Recently, there appears to have been a downgrading of interactions between English regions and the EU, in large part because of budgetary pressures. Sykes and Lord (2011) have looked at this development in some detail, and argue that this downgrading has been both quantitative, a reduction in the number of collective English regional representations, and qualitative, a shift within the remaining representations away from monitoring developments in EU policy and legislation and towards a narrow focus on EU funding opportunities.

The authors report a concern amongst those involved in English representation with the prospect of 'missing something big' in terms of European legislation, and subsequently missing the opportunity

to exert influence 'before things get into print'. The fact that this downsizing has occurred within the context of a particularly active European policy environment, with negotiations over the CAP, the next multi-annual financial framework, and cohesion policy, means that, as one official put it, "things will come to a head just as we are walking away" (Sykes and Lord, 2011:494-496). There is, perhaps, an implicit warning in this example that could be applied to Wales with regard to the loss of a constant forum for EU matters.

Westminster

The focus for examining European issues at Westminster is scrutiny: both directly, of European proposals, and of the UK Government's positions and activities. The House of Lords has a European Select Committee, whose role is to hold government to account for its actions at the EU level, as well as seven sub-committees that look at specific areas of European activity.

The House of Commons has a European Scrutiny Committee, whose primary role is to scrutinise draft EU legislation with a view to influencing UK ministers on such proposals, as well as to hold UK ministers to account for their activities in the Council of Ministers. Alongside this committee sit three further European Committees, again looking at specific areas of European influence. In October 2012 the European Scrutiny Committee launched an enquiry into the European Scrutiny System in the House of Commons. There may be implications for the Welsh system of scrutiny that come out of this enquiry.⁹

Scotland and Northern Ireland

There are several differences in the approach of Scottish and Welsh legislatures when it comes to the EU. Beginning with the Scottish Parliament, the most obvious is that it articulates an overall strategy for European relations. According to the strategy:

“...the main role of the Scottish Parliament in relation to Europe is to scrutinise the Scottish Government and its engagement in Europe”.¹⁰

Specifically, this comprises both direct scrutiny of the government in terms of its European priorities, with the European and External Relations Committee taking evidence from the responsible Minister on a six-monthly basis, and scrutiny of the JMC(E) process. This focuses particularly on the Scottish Government's input, taking evidence from the Minister before and after each meeting. As with the National Assembly, the Scottish Parliament undertakes direct monitoring and scrutiny of draft European legislation, pursuing an approach of early engagement.

As mentioned previously, the Scottish Parliament retains a European and External Relations Committee which acts as an 'informed and competent conduit' for the thematic committees and horizon-scans on behalf of the Parliament. There are also designated EU 'reporters' on each of the subject committees. Unlike Wales, however, the Scottish Parliament does not maintain its own Brussels representation (though the Scottish Government's representation does have additional capacity when compared to Wales, with 15/16 to 9 members of staff respectively). Whether or not this means that they are less able to directly influence emerging EU legislation is a question that is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worth bearing in mind when making a comparison between the approaches of the two legislatures.

As a whole, the Scottish Parliament has a more strategic approach to European affairs than the National Assembly, particularly focused around scrutiny of the Executive branch and the JMC(E)

process. This may, of course, have both positive and negative implications for their overall engagement with European issues.

The Scottish Government has frequently called for greater authority over its EU policy, particularly following the SNP's victory in the 2011 elections. Specifically, they have argued for the Memorandum of Understanding to be amended to remove the requirement for Scottish Ministers to write to the UK Government asking permission to attend EU meetings as part of the UK delegation. More generally, the Scottish Government has called for greater involvement in the process of reaching an agreed UK 'line'. As of the end of 2012, the UK Government had yet to respond to these proposals, prompting some suggestion that there had been a 'hardening' of its attitude towards these issues.

Northern Ireland has not been as active as either Scotland or Wales in its European engagement. It has never had a dedicated European committee. Instead, responsibility in the Northern Ireland Assembly lies with the Committee for the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. As with the Scottish Parliament, the Assembly does not maintain its own Brussels representative.

Conclusion

The Welsh authorities recognise the importance of the European context, particularly as regards the direct benefits of European funding and areas with a pronounced impact on Welsh policy such as the CAP. The approach of both the executive and legislative branches in Wales has evolved to focus increasingly on 'up-streaming' their policy preferences. There are, however, a number of outstanding issues:

1. The capacity of the Welsh Government to play a role in the UK's European policy formation, particularly with the differences in the political colour of the governments at either end of the M4 since 2010. Of great relevance here is the largely informal structures of inter-governmental relations.
2. The ability of the Assembly to maintain a strategic focus on EU affairs in the absence of a dedicated committee.
3. The nature of the Assembly's scrutiny of European issues, particularly with regards to the Welsh Government's activities and relations with their UK counterparts. This appears to be less developed, or at least formalised, than either the Scottish and Westminster Parliaments.

It would not be accurate to conclude that the Welsh Government and National Assembly are any less 'engaged in Europe' than are Scottish or UK institutions. Rather, this engagement is qualitatively different. Particularly evident in the approach of the National Assembly, the focus seems to be very clearly on direct engagement with European institutions.

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Notes

- 1 A European commission report concerning the application of state-aid rules to public service broadcasting can be found at ec.europa.eu/.../state_aid/.../broadcasting_communication_en.pdf
- 2 The European and External Affairs conducted a detailed enquiry into cohesion policy and its reports can be accessed at: <http://www.assemblywales.org/bus-home/bus-third-assembly/bus-committees/bus-committees-other-committees/bus-committees-third-aur-home/bus-committees-third-aur-agendas.htm?ds=6/2009>
- 3 A commentary on this report can be accessed at <http://www.clickonwales.org/2012/10/europe-2-why-mobilising-euro-funding-matters-to-wales/>
- 4 This strategy can be accessed at: <http://wales.gov.uk/topics/international/publications/eustrategy2012/?lang=en>
- 5 The text to this speech can be found at <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/events/2012/11/20121108t1830vHKT.aspx>
- 6 Carwyn Jones, reported in the Western Mail 16th December 2011 <http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/2011/12/16/welsh-first-minister-carwyn-jones-seeking-to-forge-stronger-links-in-europe-91466-29962559/>
- 7 See point 3 above
- 8 The Economic and Social Research Council recently held a seminar series looking at the effects of incongruence on IGR in the UK, and as part of this programme dedicated a session to the Europeanisation of intergovernmental relations. The briefings from this session can be accessed at www.institute-of-governance.org/_data/.../IGR_Briefing_EU.doc
- 9 <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/european-scrutiny-committee/news/david-lidington-transcript/>
- 10 This strategy can be accessed at http://archive.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/europe/inquiries/euDirectives/documents/EUStrategy_Final.pdf